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FOREWORD
Many environmental and social problems involve questions of land
use. As an area of social policy, land use poses a fundamental dilemma.
This dilemma 1s defined when the private landowner says "I win decide
how I will use land which I own," and his neighbor, or his community, or
some broader social goal (the "public interest") replies "You can use
the land you own in any way you desire, so long as you do not harm me."
There Is no doubt that the application of rational planning and
reasonable regulations can remedy or forestall most of the abuses resulting
from traditions which exalt the autonomy of the private landowner as
concerns his land. Neither is there any doubt that such planning and
regulations constrict individual free choice and are consequently
regarded by many landowners as intrusions upon fundamental rights.
One of the functions of the law is to define such dilemmas by
determining in individual cases, when conflict exists, which side wi11
prevail and why. Over time, a method evolves for recognizing and
balancing the relevant competing interests. The article by Alan Freeman
describes the historical development of public restrictions on the use of
private land. Whether or not one is interested in the legalities of land
use questions, this article serves as a valuable background piece by
identifying the significant individual and social interests involved.
The Appendices outline some recent expansions of the power of Minnesota
to control private land use, and include a short glossary of land use
terms and a list of suggested readings.
In May 1975, the AH-University Council on Environmental Quality
invited a number of representatives from citizen's groups and State agencies
to a meeting at which problems of concern to these groups and agencies were
discussed. One of the suggestions made at the meeting was that the Council
could perform a useful service by preparing a series of short reports
dealing with current environmental issues in Minnesota. The general issue
of land use control was of concern to virtually a11 of the individuals
present at that meeting. This report is the first of the series. The
report was prepared by Steven Emim'ngs - a staff member of the Council and
a law student at the University of Minnesota. It was discovered that
Alan D. Freeman, Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, had
recently completed a paper dealing with land use controls. He has
graciously permitted us to include his paper in this report.
Dean E. Abrahamson
Chairman, AU-Umversity Council on
Environmental Quality
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a "natural" use of the land; that is, -ignoring the presence
of man and the impact of his decisions, there is a condition of'the earth's
surface which could be described as "natural". This natural condition may
be described at any point in time but it is, of course, an evolving system.
For example, lakes undergo a natural aging process from lake to marsh to
dry land; and features which once dominated Minnesota's landscape such as
glaciers, fresh water seas, and even a mountain range, are now gone.
Superficially, this natural condition of the land can be characterized by
describing the pattern of vegetation (non-agncu1tura1) and the distribution
of surface water.
VEGETATION AT TIME OF EARLIEST WHITE SETTLEMENT
-1-
Land ownership -is an arbitrary system which results in the land
surface being divided into parcels and even in the division of the surface
from -its underlying nn.nerals (only in recent years has it been required
that severed mineral rights be registered in Minnesota). Land use then
becomes a function of the landowner's decisions; -it is the natural condition
of the land as modified by the landowner's desires and needs. For example,
marshes may be drained and the land converted to agricultural purposes;
the land may be covered by butldmgs, cities, highways, or reservoirs; land
might be "preserved" to some degree (left to the forces which cause the
evolution of natural land condition); channels of rivers and streams can
be altered or dammed; and the surface of the land can be removed to reach
underlying minerals.
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There are, however, a variety of restrictions on the freedom of
landowner choices about land use. Approximately twenty percent of Minnesota's
land -is owned by federal, state, or county governments. Land use decisions
for this publicly owned land are made by public bodies and are little
affected by private individuals. Public control of private land use is an
active and sometimes controversial area of social and legal policy. The
use of land which is privately owned is subject to restrictions imposed by
nuisance law, building codes, pollution and health regulations, taxation,
and zoning regulations.
When a public body decides to control private land use, it has
essentially two routes which it might follow: purchase of the land or
regulation of its use. Purchasing the land outright, either through
negotiation or the power of eminent domain (condemnation proceedings), is
very expensive and frequently unnecessary to achieve the regulatory goal.
A less expensive alternative is the purchase of an easement (the purchase
of just as much of the landowner's development rights as is necessary to
attain the regulatory goal). Regulations (no compensation to the landowner)
can forbid certain uses or require conformance with established
standards. The power to regulate the use of privately owned land may only
be exercised when authorized by law. If a regulation restricts the landowner's
freedom of choice "too much," it will violate federal and state constitutional
prohibitions against the taking of private land for public purposes without
compensation.
Zoning regulations, a common and growing form of public control
of private land use, originated and developed in an urban setting. In
recent years, environmental concerns and the expansion of the "planning"
function of government have pushed this type of regulation into outlying
areas. It is foreseeable that a11 of Minnesota's land wi11 one day be
zoned and subject to controls as to use. The statute which declares
Minnesota's environmental policy contains the following language:
In order to carry out the policy set forth
[in this section] ...it is the continuing responsibility
of the state government to use a11 practicable means,
consistent with other considerations of state policy,
to coordinate state plans, functions, programs, and
resources to the end that the state may:
Constitution of the State of Minnesota, Article I, section 13: "Private
property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without
just compensation therefor, first paid or secured."
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(f) Develop and implement land use and environmental
policies, plans and standards for the state as a whole
and for major regions thereof through a coordinated
program of planning and land use control;...
'(Minnesota Statutes 1974, section 116D.02, subdivision 2)
At present municipalities, counties, regional development
commissions, states, multi-state commissions, and the federal government
[11 play a role m land use planning and decision making. There is a
:ontroversy over whether these decisions should be in the hands of local
lovernments which are presumably more responsive to local needs and
lesires, or in the hands of larger units of government which presumably
act in the broader interest of the state or the country.
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC RESTRICTIONS
ON THE USE OF PRIVATE LAND
by Alan D. Freeman
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
Most people who buy land in the United States buy it with a view
toward exploiting it for commercial, industrial, agricultural, residential,
or other use. Both tradition and popular expectation support the idea
that one is entitled to realize the maximum economic potential from one's
tract of land in accordance with a personal choice as to mode of use. It
is this basic expectation of exploitation that is being re-thought by courts
and by state and local legislative bodies around the country today. A
combination of economic concerns, environmental concerns, and population
pressures has produced a bewildering array of novel and often highly
restrictive regulations of land use. You may be told that your land is a
valuable public resource that should not be developed at a11, but simply
left in its natural state. You may be told that you wi11 not receive
permission to develop your land until some future date when the community
can afford to provide you with essential services, such as sewers or roads,
or you may be told that you have purchased land in an area whose priority
for development is low, and that you win not be permitted to develop
until other, high priority, areas have been exhausted.
While these recent developments seem restrictive and contrary to
many assumptions about the meaning of private land ownership, it is dear
that American law has never recognized a complete freedom to do with your
land whatever you want to do. A basic obstacle to such complete freedom,
one that inevitably leads to restrictions, is that what you do with your
land is likely to have an impact on what other people may do with their
land, or on the commumty as a whole. If you build a house on your land,
you can retain residential peace and quiet only by forcing a11 of your
neighbors to use their land in a similar fashion, even if your neighbors
would prefer to build stores or factories on their property. On the other
hand, if you build a store or factory, you are forcing your neighbors to
use their land in a similar fashion, or at least in some way that wi'11 not
be offended by your noises, odors, or other discomforts. The aggregate of
a11 of these impacts of one's land use on other land may be referred to as
the spillover effects of land use. Restrictions on private land use are
designated to regulate or Hmit spi'Hover effects m a manner that maximizes
land use benefits for the community as a whole in accordance with acceptable
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ethical principles. The absence of any such regulation would likely lead to
chaos, or to settlements of disputes by force.
There is then a basic tension between the notion of private land
ownership and development and the spi1lover effects produced by private
choices of land use. The history of public regulation of private land is
a history of the evolving ground rules for resolution of that tension.
Before proceeding with a discussion of that background, it seems useful to
point up a distinction between two important categories of spiHover effects.
Some kinds of spiHover effects give rise to issues as to where the
activities that produce them should be located. Host people agree that we
should have shopping centers, factories, gas stations, and apartment houses
located somewhere in the community, but few people want these facilities
next door to their farms or residences. The spitlover effects produced by
these activities are localized; the debate is over location. These
localized spi'Hovers are a primary subject for 1and-use regulation, and
will serve as the basic model for my discussion. Another kind of spiHover
effect might be termed the pervasive one, the activity that the community
regards as inappropriate anywhere. Regulations that set absolute ceilings
on smoke emission, or water pollution, or noise production are of this type.
And there are many regulations that refuse to fall neatly into either
category, which may contain elements of each. In terms of regulation of
land use, the pervasive spiHover effect is the one that is most likely to
present a serious danger to the health or welfare of the community as a
whole, and for that reason may be a more acceptable candidate for severe
restriction. The debate with respect to these kinds of restrictions tends
to be over whether there is or is not a serious danger presented, as in the
Reserve Mining case, rather than a debate over whether 1t is legitimate to
engage in an activity that endangers the health of the entire community.
The primary subject of my paper will be the regulations that are directed
at accepted legitimate activities, where the effect of the regulation is
not to ban the activity altogether, but to te11 you that it must be done
somewhere else, or at some other time.
In order to understand the current legal framework for assessing
the validity of governmental restrictions on the localized spiHover effects
of land use, it is necessary first to explore the legal predecessor of
those governmental restrictions, the law of private nuisances. Prior to
the ZOth century, the primary recourse, under Anglo-American law, for an
aggrieved landowner complaining about his neighbor's activities, was for
him to go to court and charge that his neighbor was a nuisance. As early
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as 1306 there is a case where a neighbor went into court and complained
that his neighbor had planted a grove of trees producing so much shade
that the corn of the complaining neighbor could not ripen. Unfortunately,
there is no record available of the disposition of the case, but the fact
that such a case was brought shows the long history of the kinds of disputes
I am talking about. If you succeeded in winning a nuisance case, you
might receive a court order requiring your neighbor to cease the noxious
activity altogether, or an order to change the conduct of the activity to
the point where its noxious impacts were reduced, or at least a judgment
for money damages as compensation for the injuries inflicted on you.
The basic problem for courts in nuisance cases was defining those
activities that were to be legally regarded as nuisances, which, since we
are talking about acti'vi titles that may be appropriate somewhere in the
community, meant that courts had to decide which of the conflicting land
uses was inappropriate in a given place. The basic legal rule from which
this area of law has evolved is the ancient maxim, "Sic Utere Tuo Ut AUenum
Non Laedas," which, roughly translated, means "So use your land as not to
injure that of your neighbor," which is little more than a 1and-use version
of the Golden Rule. The basic question was how to find an acceptable
principle for determining whether the factory should stay and the homeowner
should go, or the factory should go and the homeowner should stay. A
number of approaches have been tried, none of which has really proved
successful.
One approach is to decide that some kinds of land uses are
inherently more deserving of protection than others. A number of courts
in the United States, especially in the 19th century, tried this approach
by taking the position that residential use of land 1s the highest form
of use, and that any activity that conflicts with residential use must go.
A typical judicial expression of this doctrine, one from an early 20th
century case, is the statement that "the rights of habitation are superior
to the rights of trade, and whenever they conflict, the rights of trade
must yield to the primary or natural right." Under this doctrine, then,
any conflict between a resident and any other kind of land use would be
resolved in favor of the resident. Two examples may illustrate why this
approach was unsuccessful. Suppose a person voluntarily buys a house that
is in an industrial or agricultural area, and then complains about the
smoke from the industries, or the odor of the farm animals. Under the
approach that always favors the resident, the homeowner who invaded the
established area could restrict or terminate the earlier activities,
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regardless of economic impact or any notion of fairness to the established
activities. Although some early cases, such as one where a person
constructed a home next door to an existing brickyard, granted relief to
the resident, later cases declined to relieve the homeowner who knowingly
purchased in an area other than residential, such as next door to an
airport, or in an agricultural area, or in an industrial urban area. In
fact, by the mid-twentieth century you can find judicial opinions that
have rewarded the doctrine about residence being superior to trade to the
point where it reads, "the rights of habitation in_residenti^1 districts
are ordinarily superior to the rights of trade or business therein,
particularly where the business may be defined as nonessential and not
dependent upon a fixed location." And even where the resident was the
first user in an area, there were cases where the area later came to be
dominated by inconsistent uses, such as the few remaining homes in an
area on'gi'nany residential that are now surrounded by industrial facilities.
Do we close a11 the factories to satisfy a few residential users, regardless
of economic impact? The rule that gave automatic preference to residential
users was doomed from the outset as an unworkable approach.
Another possible approach is to say that the activity that
settled in an area first should always win against subsequent inconsistent
activities. While this idea has often been considered, most American
courts have rejected it as a firm principle for resolving nuisance cases.
To say that the person who gets there first should win means that anyone
who sets up any kind of activity in an area has been granted the power to
determine the character of that area for the future. Such an approach,
which effectively delegates a planning function to the whim of individual
decisions, may we11 lead to chaotic arrangement of land uses and economic
inefficiency.
The solution finally adopted by most courts was to take both the
firstness factor and the importance of residences into account, but then
to qualify the decision on the basis of an overall assessment of the
character of the area. Courts decided whether the area in question was
residential, or industrial, or agricultural, or commercial, and then
decided which of the existing land-uses were appropriately located and
which were out of place. These judicial efforts produced in some cases a
kind of careful line-drawing not unlike that engaged in to implement
contemporary zoning ordinances. Thus, as nuisance law finally developed
in the 20th century, you could win only by showing that you were suffering
a harm caused by a neighboring activity that was out of place given the
overall character of the neighborhood. But even in such cases, in most
states it remains within the discretion of the court whether you can
receive an order dosing down the offensive activity, or merely receive
money damages to compensate you for the injury suffered, with the offensive
activity permitted to continue as before.
In terms of public regulation of land use through statutes and
ordinances, one very important point emerges from this history of nuisance
law: those activitities that would most likely be regarded as nuisances
by a court applying the above rules are the ones that can most easily be
regulated out of existence by public regulations. But this is not to say
that the underlying definitional problems in nuisance law have alt been
resolved; in fact, there are serious unanswered questions as to what kinds
of harms are serious enough to be worthy of complaint, and as to what
procedure should be employed for defining the character of an area. When
an area is designated "residential" for purposes of nuisance law, do you
mean single-fami'ly houses, or a11 residences, or single-family houses on
large lots only? To the extent you go beyond the simply classification
"residential," you are making finer distinctions than would have been made
by courts -in nuisance cases, and are achieving results that would have been
unobtainable in nuisance cases. But I wilt pick this up again after a
momentary digression.
When the government tells you that you cannot use your land in a
particular way, the government is interfering with freedom of choice with
respect to your private property. For example, if you are told by the
government that your locality is short of parkland, and that therefore
you cannot use your lot for anything other than a public park, you should
justifiably feel outraged that you are being asked to supply a park for
your neighbors and not being compensated for your loss in terms of what
you planned to do with your land. On the other hand, if you maintain a
smoky factory in the middle of a residential neighborhood, you should not
feel outraged 1f the local government closes your factory, since it is
likely that your neighbors could have achieved the same result by going
into court and complaining that you were a nuisance. Unfortunately, most
of the current cases are not so easy as either of the two examples, but
the examples do serve to illustrate the basic distinction in this area.
Both state and federal constitutions provide that the government cannot
take your land for public use unless you receive compensation for your
toss. Thus, if the government wants a new park and wishes to use
privately-owned land, it should pay the private owner for the imposition
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on the private owner's freedom. On the other hand, it is within the
inherent power of government to pass laws to promote the health and safety
of the public, and no private individual can claim the right to conduct
activities that are harmful to his or her neighbors. People who are
ordered to cease such activities have no legitimate claim for compensation
for being totd to stop what they are doing. The basic distinction is
between taking, where the restriction imposed by the government wi'11 give
rise to a claim for compensation, and regulation, which is a permissible
activity of government giving rise to no claim for compensation. Those
restrictions that fall in the category of regulation are, in the context
of localized spillover effects of 1and-use, based on private nuisance law,
which I discussed earlier. The more closely the activity subjected to
regulation resembles a traditional private nuisance, the more likely it
is that government can stop the activity without incurring an obligation
to compensate the restricted landowner. The problem for the courts has
been to differentiate the regulations from the takings.
The easiest case for categorization as a taking is the one where
the government physically occupies your land for a new highway, or a school,
or other public building. Clearly, in such cases the government has taken
your land and must compensate you. The more difficult cases are those
where you are left in possession of your land, but you have been severely
restricted in your choices of land use. In a number of important cases,
the United States Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of these questions
of constitutional interpretation, has been required to evaluate particular
restrictions to decide whether they are takings or regulations.
Four of the most important Supreme Court cases dealing with the
limits of land-use regulation were decided in the period between 1883 and
1926; those cases set the basic ground rules for such regulation today.
In 1883, the Court decided the case of Nuqler v. Kansas, in which the
owner and operator of a brewery challenged a state law that banned the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages. The state law declared
that the places and equipment for the manufacture of such beverages were
public nuisances. The owner claimed that he had entered the brewery
business when it was legal to do so, that he had invested $10,000 in the
brewery, and that the effect of the state law was to deprive him of nearly
a11 of the value in his property by rendering it worthless and not
compensating him. The Supreme Court rejected the brewery owner's claim,
basically saying that the state could decide that alcoholic beverages were
a kind of public nuisance, offensive to health and morals, and that by
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analogy to traditional nuisance law, it was within the power of the state
to outlaw the activity altogether by virtue of its regulatory powers.
Although the particular case involved the pervasive kind of harm (in
that alcoholic beverages were banned throughout the state) rather than a
localized one, the basic principle was established that when the state
merely wishes to terminate a nuisance, it need not compensate the offending
landowner. The Court said that such a case was very different from one
where unoffending property 1's taken away from an innocent owner.
Similar, and decided in 1915, was the case of Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
which did involve a localized spiHover effect of land use. The challenged
ordinance in that case required the immediate termination of the operations
of a brickyard that had preexisted other development in its area but was
now in a residential neighborhood. The economic effect of the ordinance
was to reduce the value of the bed of day surrounding the brickyard from
$800,000 to $60,000. The Supreme Court, relying on the nuisance analogy,
upheld the regulation as a valid exercise of governmental power. As you
may recall from our earlier discussion of nuisance law, courts in nuisance
cases have rejected the claim of the first user in a particular area
where the area is now dominated by another kind of land use to the point
where it can be said that the first activity has become out of place and
is causing harm to the now dominant activity. This approach led to the
Supreme Court's approval of restriction without compensation in the
Hadacheck case.
Of the four Supreme Court cases, the next two dealt with
activities that would probably never be regarded as nuisances under
traditional nuisance law. And it was 1n these cases that the Court began
to set some limitations on the scope of government power to regulate land
use. In 1922, the Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahpn,
which involved a peculiar landowning practice common in much of Pennsylvania
at that time. Many coal companies had purchased huge tracts of land in
the 19th century to plan for future coal needs. Having no use for much of
this land at the time of purchase, and not expecting to need it for some
time, the coal companies sold to various purchasers rights to the surface
only, retaining a11 rights to the underlying minerals. These purchasers
proceeded to erect their homes and businesses on the land. In fact,
entire cities came to be located on such land, with the coal companies
continuing to own a11 rights to use the land beneath the surface. Finally,
in the 20th century, the coal companies arrived to begin mining the land
underneath a11 the homes and businesses, even though such mining activities
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would disrupt or even destroy the property of the surface owners.
Pennsylvania responded to this problem by enacting a statute providing
that mining was prohibited wherever such mining would cause the subsidence
of land under a structure used as a human habitation. The coal companies
went to the United States Supreme Court, complaining that the law
regulating their right to mine effectively destroyed their property rights
in the minerals underneath the surface, and that such action could not be
taken without payment of compensation.
In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the claim of the coal
companies. The theory of the decision was that there are some cases where
regulations that limit property rights simply go too far; in this case,
the regulation effectively destroyed a11 value in the minerals by making
mining impossible. The effect of the regulation was to transform property
rights in the surface only, which was a11 that had been acquired originally
by the surface users, into absolute property rights in the land, which
they had never owned. An important point here is that the surface owners
could never have succeeded in attacking the mining activity as a nuisance,
because they had acquired their land with less than even the usual expectation
of a landowner as far as conflicting land uses. By buying the surface
only, they had implicitly agreed that their enjoyment was contingent upon
the future desires of the coal companies. Another point is that the
regulation, while perhaps serving the health and safety of the community
as a whole, took away a11 value owned by the coal companies. If they
could not mine their land, they could not do anything with it. In such a
case, the Supreme Court said, the state could stop the mining activities,
but only by paying the coal companies the value of their property. Thus,
if a regulation attempts to ban an activity that would not have been subject
to attack under private nuisance law, the state must either compensate the
affected property owner, or make sure that the regulation does not go too
far in its economic impact on the person subjected to the regulation.
The regulation principle was again tested in 1926 in the famous
case of Village of Eudid v. Ambler Realty Co., which was the first Supreme
Court case to deal with comprehensive municipal zoning. The zoning
ordinance involved in the Euc1_ic[ case was a simple one in comparison with
contemporary zoning laws; it divided the village into industrial, light
industrial, commercial, and residential zones. The residential category
was further subdivided into separate zones for apartment houses,
two-family houses, and sing1e-fami1y houses. The landowner challenging
the zoning ordinance claimed that those portions of its land placed in
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residential zones would suffer a reduction in value from $10,000 per acre
to $2,500 per acre.
In terms of the nuisance law background, what zoning set out to
do was to prevent nuisance situations from arising by allocating areas to
particular kinds of land uses in advance, thereby minimizing the number
of possible spiHover conflicts. Instead of waiting for a retail store,
for example, to complain about the noise or smoke from a neighboring factory,
the ordinance told people where to locate their stores and factories so as
to prevent such conflicts from arising. But the ordinance involved in
Eudi'd went we11 beyond mere prospective regulation of nuisances in its
distinction between different kinds of residential areas. No nuisance
case had ever decided that an apartment house or two-family house was a
nuisance to a single-family house.
The Supreme Court nevertheless accepted the nuisance analogy as
a basis for upholding the zoning ordinance, saying that by analogy apartment
houses did have nuisance impacts on neighboring single-family houses, and
that therefore the regulation could provide for separation of those land
uses. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court made it dear that
zoning does go beyond nuisance law by adopting the idea from the Mahon case
that the regulation is valid so long as it does not go too far in depriving
the landowner of value in the property. This aspect of the decision was
confirmed two years later in another Supreme Court case, Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, where the Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance to the
extent it applied to designate as residential land. that was dearly
worthless for such uses, where the result could have been avoided by the
municipality if it had drawn its zoning map to follow the adjacent streets,
instead of cutting across the corner owned by the complainant, which corner
was a small part of large neighboring industrial area.
To the extent that zoning laws outlaw activities that would never
have been regarded as nuisances, then, the landowner affected must be left
with some value in the property, not necessarily the most lucrative use
possible, but some reasonable possibility of use. In addition, zoning
laws have not been as quick to stamp out the rights of the first user in
a given area as courts were in nuisance cases. Most zoning laws provide
protection for what are called prior nonconformi'ng uses, that is, established
land uses accompanied by previously erected structures that would be in
violation of a subsequently enacted zoning law. The conferral of
nonconforrrring use status on these activities is a compromise that seeks to
avoid catastrophic land value impacts. A familiar example is the lone
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grocery store in the middle of a residential neighborhood. Thus zoning
stops short of the degree of restriction, 1n terms of market value loss,
that could be imposed by a court in a nuisance case.
On the other hand, the Eudid case gave local governments a
tremendous amount of power to regulate. A primary basis for this expansion
of power was the Euclid case's approval of the concept of regulating
density of population, which it did by upholding the distinction between
single-family residences and apartment houses. It is this principle of
density regulation that permits distinctions to be made not only between
multi-family and si'ngte-family houses, but also between two-famHy houses
and si'ng1e-fam-i1y houses, and between si'ngle-family houses on 1/2 acre
lots, and si'ng1e-fam11y houses on 1 acre lots, and single-famHy houses on
5-acre lots. Many modern zoning ordinances provide for a hierarchy of
residential zones with a minimum lot size provided for each. In effect,
such laws are saying that a house on a 1-acre lot is in some sense a
nuisance to a house on a 3-acre lot. This kind of disfinction suggests
how far beyond traditional nuisance law modern land-use regulation has gone.
Recent cases have further extended the analogy to nuisance law
and in so doing have further increased the scope of governmental power to
regulate land use. One assumption underlying the cases that I have discussed
so far is that whenever regulation goes beyond the termination of an
activity that would be regarded as a traditional nuisance, the landowner
is entitled to be regulated up to the point where the land retains some
reasonable value, but no further. This assumption has now been called into
question, at least in Wisconsin, by a very significant cas^ decided in
1972 by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Just v. Narinette County. The case
involved a county program for regulating use of shorelands. Under the
statutory scheme, the owner of land designated as "wetland" under the
statute cannot fi11 in the land without first obtaining a permit from the
local government. Owners of land who went ahead and commenced fiH-i'n
operations without even having sought such a permit were charged with a
violation of the statute. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in upholding the
statute announced a new vi.ew of landowner expectations, saying that one
does not necessarily have the expectation of exploiting one's land for its
economic value, where the expectation includes the necessity of changing
the land from its natural state. The effect of this doctrine, if it is
adopted elsewhere, may be to limit severely the traditional expectations
of landowners and would-be developers of land. The early nuisance cases
started from the premise of free exploitation of land, subject to regulation
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if you caused substantial harm to your neighbors. Ue may be shifting to
a scheme where your decision to develop or make use of your land is not a
given, but something that must be justified as wise and not tikety to
produce adverse impact before you can obtain permission to go ahead.
Government programs like that upheld in the Just case are a product
of increasing awareness of the subtle and often disastrous impacts of human
activities, especially land development, on the surrounding human and
natural environment. In one sense, this increasing awareness may be
viewed as a more sophisticated kind of nuisance law; with greater scientific
knowledge our concept of harm changes. Along with greater scientific
knowledge has come an increasing awareness of the risks that may follow any
change in the natural environment, risks not only to plant and animal life,
but risks to people as well. That there is such a changing perception of
the relationship between people and their environment is dearly evident
in court cases involving 1and-use regulation.
Another significant recent case is a particularly striking
example of this changing attitude. The case expanded local land use
regulatory power largely on the basis of feared but presently unknown
dangers to the environment. The case. Steel Hl'H Development, Inc. v.
Town of Sanbornton, involved a small rural town in New Hampshire, a town
with a year-round population ofi1,000 that increases to 2,000 in the summer
because of its attractiveness as a summer resort. A developer had
purchased a large amount of land in the town with a view toward constructing
summer homes for about 500 families. At the time of purchase, the land
was zoned for minimum lot sizes of 3/4 acre. As a result of a public
outcry against the developer's plan, the town responded by rezoning the
entire tract, placing 70 percent of it in a new "Forest Conservation Zone,"
with a six-acre minimum lot size requirement, and the remainder in an
Agricultural zone, with a 3-acre minimum lot size requirement. The
environmental fears of the townsfolk included water pollution, interference
with smelt spawning, increased traffic, and air pollution, and a general
fear of destruction of the rural character of the town. There was little
or no data offered to back up these fears, but the court nevertheless
upheld the ordinance, concluding that there was enough basis for concern
to justify an interim program of restrictions (the ordinance had been in
effect nearly two years at the time the case was decided) to enable the
town to explore the anticipated environmental problems. Here again we
find a significant shift away from the requirements of nuisance law.
Rather than regulating to prevent demonstrable harms, the town is regulating
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to give itself a chance to assess the possibility of harm. Again the
landowner's expectation is reduced from the right to proceed unless harm
will occur, to a right to proceed only if it is dear that harm will not
occur.
Harmful impact to justify 1and-use regulation need not even be
limited to the natural environment. A very important case decided by the
United States Supreme Court last year (Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre),
in fact the first zoning case decided by the court 1n 45 years, upheld the
right of a small residential town to use extreme measures to preserve its
established character and way of life. The town is one that is zoned
exclusively for single-famity residential use on minimum acreage lots.
The zoning ordinance went on to define "family" for purposes of the
ordinance as any size group of persons related by blood, marriage, or
adoption, and a group of no more than two unrelated persons. The
ordinance was applied to prevent a single person owning a large house from
renting out the house to a group of six graduate students from a nearby
university. Despite a claim on the part of the students and the affected
landowner that the ordinance infringed on their basic right of privacy and
freedom of association, in terms of choice of 1ifesty1e, the Supreme Court
upheld the ordinance as a valid means for regulating density in the
community. In very strong terms, the Court recognized the right of the
town to preserve its quiet residential way of life, in effect, to seal
itself off from outside population or economic pressures.
A related recent development permits municipalities to limit
1and-use for economic reasons. A very significant New York case decided
in 1972 upheld a plan for what was called "phased development," which is
essentially an extension of the basic zoning idea from allocation of land
uses over territorial space to allocation of land use over time, in that
case, over an 18-year period. Under the scheme, the town announced its
capital improvement plans for the next 18 years, with respect to services
such as sanitary sewers, drainage facilities, public parks or recreation
facilities, roads, and firehouses, and implemented a regulation that
withheld from any developer permission to develop land until the land had
been provided with a sufficient level of these services, even if that
meant waiting anywhere up to 18 years for the privilege. The only
alternative under the scheme is to assume personally the cost of providing
the requisite level of services, rather than waiting to have them provided
through general taxation, a cost that would in most cases be prohibitive
under the plan. Here too traditional expectations are being altered. A
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town can regulate the amount of development by regulating the level of
services it is willing to provide, and the amounts it is willing to tax
itself for providing them. While the scheme does not take away a11 value
from those not permitted to develop now, it certainly would seem to
reduce land values by compelling a waiting period prior to authorization
for development. The justifications are efficiency, prevention of tax
burdens, prevention of sprawl, and recognition of financial reality, but
the increase in regulatory power is significant.
The cases discussed here have involved the most significant
increases in regulatory power. There have been other cases that have
struck down zoning ordinances as going too far, and have taken other
interests into account. In a number of states, large mim'mum lot size
requirements have been invalidated, but those cases did not involve
significant environmental arguments of the sort raised in Sanbornton, and
were decided prior to the Belle Terre case. The most extreme 1and-use
regulation to reach a court in recent times was struck down, one that
explicitly attempted to limit the population of a town by setting a
ceiling on the number of building permits available annually. The case is
presently on appeal. And the techniques discussed above provide ways of
coming very dose to limiting population growth without doing so explicitly.
These comments are not necessarily to the point of finding anything
wrong with these increases 1n regulatory power, but an attempt to show how
current developments relate to and grow out of the historical legal
background. Increasing regulations mean increasing and possibly awesome
burdens to be imposed on those who are subjected to regulation. If we are
to protect our environment and maximize the value of our resources, we
must do so in a way that insures an equitable sharing of our limited
resources.
Cited cases:
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Hadachek v/'Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
Pennsylvania Coal Co7 v. Mahon^, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)
ViTlage of Euclid v7 Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.'S. 365 (1926)
Nect^wv. City of Cambndse, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)
Jy^t v. Mannette"County, 201 N.U.2d 761 (U.S. 1972)
Steel Hi 11 Development, Inc. v. Town_of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956"(1st'Cir.~i9^2)"" """ " '""""' •'""""""-""'
Bor^as_v. Village of Be11e Terre, 94 S.Ct. 1536 (1974).
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Appendix I
POWERS OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA
The State of Minnesota has no comprehensive plan for the
development of its land. There does exist, however, a large number of
laws which grant state executive agencies authority to perform many acts
dealing with aspects of the land use question. A recent (1973) survey
of selected chapters of Minnesota Statutes for existing land use control
powers - powers to finance, enforce, maintain, and reserve, in addition
to the customary powers to acquire, regulate, develop and dispose of
land and its related uses - turned up nearly 800 separate such powers.
Nearly 600 of these powers were found in three state agencies - Department
of Natural Resources, Department of Highways, and the Pollution Control
Agency.
Beyond the assignment of these duties to state agencies, the
legislature has passed zoning measures directed toward certain specific
activities or entities. Municipalities, for example, have comprehensive
planning authority and the power to control land use in Minnesota
Statutes SS462.351-462.364 (1974). In recent years, a number of Acts
have been passed which have enlarged the state's role 1n regulating
private land use in unincorporated areas of Minnesota. Five of these
Acts are described below:
FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT ACT (1969, amended 1973)
Citation: Minnesota Statutes §8104.01-104.07 (1974)
Authority Granted To: Department of Natural Resources and local unit
of government
The goal of this Act is the minimization of flood damage through
flood p1am management. A "flood plain" is an "area adjoining a
watercourse which has been or...may be covered" by a flood which is
"representative of large floods known to have occured generally in
Minnesota and reasonably characteristic of what can be expected to
occur on an average frequency in the magnitude of the 100 year recurrence
interval."
The Act requires local governmental units to adopt and enforce
flood plain management ordinances. Among other things, these ordinances
See Hayne Gilbert and Douglas Gregor in Appendix III.
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are to delineate flood plains, preserve the capacity of the flood plain
to carry and discharge floods, mi'm'imze flood damage, and regulate land
use in flood plains. Before adoption, ordinances must be submitted to
the Commissioner of Natural Resources for review and approval. The
Commissioner has power to adopt an ordinance in the event that the
responsible local governing um't fails to act. The Commissioner also
must pifomulgate criteria for detenmning acceptable flood plain land
uses and other flood plain management measures.
REGULATION OF SHORELAND DEVELOPMENT (1969, amended 1973)
Citation: Minnesota Statutes ?105.485 (1974)
Authority Granted To: Department of Natural Resources and local units
of government
This is an Act to "provide guidance for the wise development of
shoreland." "Shoreland" is (1) land within 1,000 feet from the normal
high watermark of a lake, pond, or flowage; and (2) land within 300 feet
of a river or stream (or the landward side of a flood plain delineated
by ordinance).
Under the Act, the Commissioner of Natural Resources has the
responsibility of promulgating statewide standards and criteria for the
subdivision, use, and development of Minnesota's shorelands. It then
becomes the responsibility of the counties (for shoreland in unincorporated
areas) and municipalities (for shoreland within city limits) to adopt and
enforce rules and regulations. The Commissioner has the power to impose
rules and regulations if the county or municipality either fails to act
or adopts an ordinance which fails to meet minimum standards.
Among the many things regulated by this Act are the following:
lot size (area) and length of water frontage suitable for a building
site; placement of structures in relation to shorelines and roads;
placement and construction of sanitary and waste disposal facilities;
and preservation of natural shorelands through restrictions on land uses.
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CRITICAL AREAS ACT (1974)
Citation: Minnesota Statutes 5i> 116G.01-n6G.14 (1974)
Authority Granted To: Minnesota Environmental Quality Council and local
units of government
This Act declares that certain areas of the state possess
"important historic, cultural, or estheti'c values, or natural systems
which perform functions of greater than local si'gm'fi'cance," and provides
that plans and regulations shall be promulgated for the use and development
of such areas.
Responsibility for drafting criteria for the selection of critical
areas was given to the EQC. Critical areas are designated by the Governor
based upon recommendations of the EQC. The Governor's order designating
a critical area is effective for no more than three years pending
approval by the legislature or the appropriate regional development
commission.
Once an area is designated by the order of the Governor, it
becomes the responsibility of local units of government to prepare plans
and regulations for the designated area. The plans and regulations of
the local governing unit are subject to the review and approval of the
EQC. The EQC has power to prepare and adopt plans for a designated
critical area, in the event that the local unit of government fails to
do so; and the authority to bring lawsuits to compel enforcement of plans
and regulations once established.
Development in critical areas is regulated by a system of permits
which may be obtained from the local governing unit. Development must be
consistent with the approved plans and regulations, and includes "the
making of any material change in the use or appearance of any structure
or land."
MINNESOTA WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS ACT (1973)
Citation: Minnesota Statutes 'ii 104.31-104.40 (1974)
Authority Granted To: Department of Natural Resources and local units
of government
The policy goal declared by this Act is the preservation and
protection of certain of Minnesota's rivers and their adjacent lands which
possess "outstanding scenic, recreational, natural, historical, scientific
and similar values." "River" is defined to include lakes through which a
river or stream flows.
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The Commissioner of Natural Resources is charged with responsibility
for developing and promulgating criteria for the classification and
designation of rivers; for designating the rivers to be included in the
system; and for promulgating regulations for, and otherwise managing,
the components of the system. Local units of government are required to
adapt or amend their ordinances to the extent necessary to comply with
the Commissioner's standards and criteria and the management plan.
The Act specifically grants authority to the Commissioner for
the purchase of scenic easements.
MINNESOTA POWER PLANT SITING ACT (1973)
Citation: Minnesota Statutes '<•n6C.51-116C.69 (1974)
Authority Granted To: Environmental Quality Council
In 1973, the EQC was granted authority to provide for power plant
sites and transmission line corridor and route selection. The legislation
declares twin policy goals which are to be balanced: (1) mim'mizing
adverse human and environmental impact, and (2) insuring electric power
system reliability and insuring that electric energy needs are met and
fulfilled.
The authority embraces power plants which have a capacity of
50,000 kw or more, and transmission lines which have a capacity of ZOO kv
or more. Among other duties, the EQC is required to adopt siting
criteria and assemble an inventory of potential sites. Utilities are
required to apply for permits and to regularly submit an advance forecast
of their projected demand and construction plans.
COASTAL ZONE PLANNING PROGRAM
In 1972, Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management Act which
provides funds for states to prepare management plans for their coastal
lands and waters. The North Shore of Lake Superior, defined for this
purpose as the entire Lake Superior watershed, is included within the
scope of this Act.
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Minnesota's Coastal Zone Planning Program is a three-year
(1974-77) comprehensive study of the North Shore aimed at developing a
plan to guide future development. The study is being coordinated by the
State Planning Agency, and the work group includes representatives of
the involved Counties, the Arrowhead Regional Development Commission,
the Pollution Control Agency and the Departments of Health, Natural
Resources, Highways, and Economic Development.
COASTAL ZONE PLANNING AREA
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Appendix II
GLOSSARY
CONDITIONAL A use which may be permitted in a district through the
USE: granting by the board of appeals of a special exception
upon a finding by the board that it meets specified
conditions.
EMHINENT The power of a governmental unit, within the territorial
DOMAIN: limits of its jurisdiction, to take property for public
use. The power may be conferred on non-sovereign entities
by legislative declaration. Compensation must be paid.
LAND: Land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and
buildups, structures, and machinery or equipment when
attached to the realty.
NONCONFORMING Any building or land lawfully occupied by a use at the
USE: effective date of (an) ordinance or amendment thereto
which does not conform after the passage of (the) ordinance
or amendment.
SCENIC "Scenic easement" means an interest in land, less than the
EASEMENTS: fee title, which limits the use of such land for the
purpose of protecting the scenic, recreational, or natural
characteristics of a wild, scenic or recreational river
area. Unless otherwise expressly and specifically provided
by the parties, such easement shall be (a) perpetually held
for the benefit of the people of Minnesota; (b) specifically
enforceable by its holder or any beneficiary; and (c)
binding upon the holder of the servient estate, h-is heirs,
successors and assigns. Unless specifically provided by
the parties, no such easement shall give the holder or
any beneficiary the right to enter on the land except for
enforcement of the easement. Minnesota Statutes (1974)
104.37
SETBACK: The distance between a street line or shoreline and the
building 1me.
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TAKING: Taking and a11 words and phrases of like import include
every interference, under the right of eminent domain,
with the possession, enjoyment or value of private
property. Minnesota Statutes (1974)^117.025
USE: (a) any purpose for which a building or other structure
or a tract of land may be designed, arranged, intended,
maintained, or occupies, or (b) any activity, occupation,
business, or operation carried on, or intended to be
carried on, in a building or other structure or on a
tract of land.
VARIANCE: A variance authorizes deviations from a literal application
of the terms of an ordinance "in instances where their
strict enforcement would cause undue hardship because of
circumstances unique to the individual property under
consideration" and will be granted only where the
deviation it allows Is "in keeping with the spirit and
intent of the ordinance."
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Appendix III
SOME SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Robert H. Anderson, The American Law of Zoning (Lawyer's Cooperative
Publishing Co., 1968 with supplementary updating).
Richard Babcock, The Zoning Game (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison,
1966).
John Borchert, Perspective on Minnesota Land Use—1974, Minnesota Land
Management Information System Study, Report K (Center for Urban
and Regional Affairs, University of Minnesota, 1974).
John Borchert and Donald Yaeger, Atlas of Minnesota Resources and
Development (Minnesota State Planning Agency, Rev. 1969).
Citizen's Advisory Committee for the Environmental Quality Council
(Minnesota), The State's Role in Land Use Planning (Environmental
Quality Council, 1974).
Uayne Gilbert and Douglas Gregor, Minnesota J..and Use Laws A Classification
of State Powers, Minnesota Land Management Information System Study,
Report if5 (Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, University of
Minnesota, 1973).
Gunnar Isberg, Local and Regional Planning in Minnesota (League of
Minnesota Mumci'palities and the Metropolitan Council, 1975).
Minnesota State Planning Agency, Programs, Policies and Legal Authorities
Affecting the Use of Land in Minnesota, Land Use Planning Report
Number 1 (St. Paul, May 1975).
Minnesota State Planning Agency, Opinions on Land Use Planning: A Survey
of_C.ounty Zomng Admfm'strators, Land Use Planning Report Number 2
(St. Paul, June 1975).
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Where to write for reports or other information:
AH-University Council on Environmental Quality
967 Social Science Building
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455
Center for Urban and Regional Affairs
311 Walter Library
Um'versi'ty of Minnesota
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455
League of Minnesota Municipalities
300 Hanover Building
480 Cedar Street
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101
Minnesota State Planning Agency
101 Capital Square Building
550 Cedar Street
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101
-28-
f ^" . ." 'T
^sss'-'
•'fei^.
':^:-- "
'<>'.. ";'•
^ ;^a...
^ . . .', • .
"•f •;y:!^
^
•••^
^•-'.-•••Cf
m^^ '':--
's*'"'^;;/ ^f^~^. ','.'
;^s&%s'.-:'^
^NitS'.e
BIH'^^''1'' >•
1*?^-;::. ^'
i'^gi.f;";''i^ -.-.y:'
'^v^..^--''^'
l^^^^^?'1 ^. • •;'.'
^s^^:'^
'i^^t '.'•'. '
[jf8&^.^ :1-. ^..•...
wss^^^-^.
\^^'^^^.^\»^\^...'f .» "*t."^-l.
l^:^'^:y;'^., '"-'^
^'^^p?^".,^.
::Mlife:'^^^^i
•s,'- "f:'- \
••^''2.
:w
M.::.
•"%''
•^
a"
''•'.'• '"•!''
'^^*
;'^^^^.-'; ; " -: '• -';.^
^;^^"'^ .. ^••'
^^^•,,-^:" •'••^
^SSI^A&^- ... -• . . ./.^<*A.^..
^BI£..L';',-rt^%
Siii^^'^S-'--'. "•:':.
tfi&'ii^'^^
^'f:::.'^-^y^ '" '
' ?'.''5-'•'".-'"-"''.' '.^'.' t"' ^'"'.
^f' •'•••i. •'%;. • •-••••
•:..."•: •;-..^':^. ^:"
••:\^:^ %,,"•'
'"'') •..., - '-^1
^•>\"'.' ,' -v,'..
^, ^^. .,.•,:,.,:;...:.
•^ y.-^^': y- ''4
.>>';'-'' •:''• •:
"^.^
:'^^'^;i
.' >'. -'. •
•-/-'•'-.
,.•"":? ••:•
•^
•"«i
^^^:'^
;^A^i:^'.
1%3W:^
Mil^&:'{-"<:""fey
'i:iK--'sf;w ". .,'-
fS6s^.&^SiMl&^.
•^,-
y.''-.
'^'.L. •?' '-.
".^^^
•"<*'t''^;:.":';'"<i"
,. 'it.-:"".-'^". ! •'
•l"'.A:.''.'l.<.rv-'.1 ••.•..
•.r^.Ai-?.....::";'-'-^':' '
^jScfwut.Si,. J...t-?£:a:K..t:a^,£.^. • ^ a ,?«.
